

though it might eventually sink out of sight, you know it will never go away. This story is also a good example of how Perinbanayagam fits emotion into his model. Theorists tend to lean cognitive or emotional, but Perinbanayagam does them both, with emotion as not just an additive but an organic element.

This is also a classic case of Garfinkel's degradation ceremony. Poussaint's self-concept had been changed, and he was still confronting this episode much later. The cop incident is also a good example of the looking-glass self. Usually we can resist insults, but if the ritual scenario is properly arranged, and this cop was a theatrical genius, the best you can do is damage control.

Another key example from the book is the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States had missiles in Italy and Turkey, aimed at Russia, and the Russians claimed giving missiles to Castro was merely tit for tat. The previous year had witnessed the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. The Kennedy brothers, with Bobby remarkably assertive, saw Cuban missiles as a significant setback in the cold war. Of course, Castro saw them as a deterrent to another invasion. The rhetoric had grown so fast that the options were either Russia pulling the missiles out of Cuba or the destruction of the human race in World War III. I was teaching in Milwaukee at the time, and I remember how quiet everyone got during the last hour. We were waiting for the sound of the bombs.

In the exchange of messages, the Russians had made inconsistent proposals, one tougher than the other, as though two different people were writing the letters. The pressure may have caused Khrushchev to drink too much. During World War II, Churchill had also experienced inconsistent messages from Russia. He would ignore the tough one and just respond to the more friendly one, as though nothing had happened. The same gambit worked for the Kennedys, and the Russians compromised. This example was also one of Herbert Blumer's favorite cases of how macro forces could go through micro channels.

A third example is games: board games, athletic events, and championship contests.

Much of American life is game-driven. Perinbanayagam shows that games are a form of dialogue and can be analyzed with his scheme. We test the self in games. Even when solitary, games have a distinctly social character. Bahktin expanded the concept of dialogue to show its pervasiveness, how meanings are especially powerful when carried by artifacts in the environment. These meanings generate an inaudible form of dialogue. Minorities live in a world where they are often degraded by the voices of things as well as by those of people. This gives us at least four dialogical spheres: with the self, with others, with the semiotically infused environment, and with animals (my step-daughter, Kate, shared her worries with our dog, Amanda).

Perinbanayagam is one of the most creative thinkers in social theory, although his modesty has limited his fame. He now has about eight solid theory books (and a detective novel). This book, short and sweet, presents a much-needed synthesis in social psychology.

The Postgenomic Condition: Ethics, Justice, and Knowledge after the Genome, by **Jenny Reardon**. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. 311 pp. \$35.00 paper. ISBN: 9780226510453.

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Jenny Reardon's *The Postgenomic Condition: Ethics, Justice, and Knowledge after the Genome* picks up and generalizes a key theme at the heart of her previous book, *Race to the Finish*. That book considered how the Human Genome Diversity Project, which geneticists envisioned with explicitly antiracist motivations as a challenge to racial classifications of human difference, nevertheless drew from a racial epistemology and was perceived by many indigenous groups as neo-colonialist exploitation. *The Postgenomic Condition* follows, in loose chronology, a half-dozen genomics projects, launched with values of political liberalism at their core, that suffered conflicts over and ambiguities within those

values, shaping the projects' scientific possibilities and capacities to serve justice.

The book's title purposefully echoes two theoretical touchstones. First, Jean-François Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* helps Reardon discuss the transformation of genetics into a computational and informational science and the ways that the surfeit of information, ironically, destabilizes knowledge and ethics. If there is one basic fact about contemporary genomics, it is that the massive growth of the science has not generated anything like a stable estimate of how genetics affects common diseases, what a genetic cause is, or what precision medicine might be, or any consensus about which uses of genetics (should there be significant uses) are permitted and how they should be distributed.

Second, and more importantly, Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* forms the ethical/political framework for engaging genomics. Reardon's basic aim is to understand how the technical affordances as well as the social, economic, and political organization of contemporary genomics shape our capacities to "think and speak" and collectively decide about what we should allow genomics to do. The book is an extended empirical engagement with what some would call the "ethical implications" of genomics. Whereas beneficence, autonomy, and justice are the three pillars of American bioethics (as laid out in the Belmont Report), Reardon aims to show how all three—but especially justice—have problematic manifestations in genomics projects. But rather than judging genomics against substantive definitions of ethics and justice, Reardon returns repeatedly to Arendt's political understanding of justice. What is it about genomics projects that enables or prevents the widest possible set of relevant parties to reflect and decide what to do about them?

The empirical heart of the book is a historical succession of genomics projects. The data are historical and ethnographic; Reardon has spent the last decade traveling to observe the development of major genomics projects and interview their principals. Each chapter considers a different project that she analyzes as exemplifying the dilemmas of a different "core concept in liberal democracy—

information, inclusion, the people, persons, property, privacy, and public" (pp. 21–22). For example, Chapter Three, about inclusion, focuses on projects proposed by researchers at Howard and Tuskegee Universities to study African Americans' genetics and health. The National Institutes of Health and the bioethics establishment were eager to disentangle genomics from the legacy of racist science, and thus they were happy to host public conversations with African Americans about the antiracist character of contemporary genetics and to undertake studies of consent and public understanding in support of the broader inclusion of minority communities in research. Ordinary citizens turned out to be less concerned about genetics than about lack of access to basic health care, but this was deemed to be beyond the NIH's purview. The NIH also declined to fund the actual research projects proposed by the HBCU researchers due to the concern that the researchers lacked the capacity to pull off their innovative project. Inclusion and beneficence were values, but not actually including African American institutions in research or bringing potential research subjects the benefits they needed.

Chapter Five considers Generation Scotland, one of a growing set of efforts in the mid-2000s to assert "genomic sovereignty" as a simultaneous project of "natural resource" control, capacity-building, population health, and national identity. The project undertook an elaborate public engagement effort to learn that the Scottish people wanted the economic and health benefits to be shared in common and for the sequencing and research to be done in Scotland. But these conditions proved hard to meet as, globally, projects failed to establish economic or medical value for genomes and as sequencing became much more technological and cheaper outside Scotland. Furthermore, scientifically and ethically, genetic data became increasingly imbued with cosmopolitanism—the data are meaningful through global comparison, and the health benefits of research came to be understood as not tied to any particular national population. Thus, the nationalist liberal politics that enabled the project were contradicted, and public engagement—which might

democratically reorganize the project's values—was essentially eliminated for budgetary reasons.

These summaries don't do the chapters justice, and space precludes summarizing others. But they offer a flavor of the detailed, sensitive, ethical-political-scientific analysis of genomics that Reardon accomplishes. Though the phrase "coproduction" doesn't appear outside the references, this is perhaps the most fully realized coproductionist account of the mutual constitution of a science with its ethical and political dimensions that I can think of. There are no social or ethical "implications" that follow the science; rather, every aspect of the science has been riven from the very beginning by explicit and implicit values and contradictions of political liberalism. Scholars of political, moral, and cultural sociology should not be dissuaded by the ostensibly scientific subject matter of this book; they will find much to engage here.

I want to mention some of the limits or questions raised by Reardon's highly innovative and successful coproductionist and Arendtian approach. Her coproduction is resolutely meso-level in its focus. It aims to show that genomic science is always already embedded in liberal politics and that bioethical possibilities are bounded by the evolving epistemic possibilities and social organization of science. But Reardon says little about the coproduction of genomics and other scales of political order. For example, how is genomics altering conceptual pillars of liberalism like the political subject? How are both the nation and transnational cosmopolitanism transformed by flows of data and evolving conceptions of genetic populations? Concrete variations in states' political traditions—varieties of liberalism—aren't seriously engaged though the book spans many national contexts.

The strength of the Arendtian standpoint is to show how the supposed virtues (democratization, inclusion, openness) and the supposed vices (capitalism, surveillance) of this era don't always have expected effects on justice—understood as the capacity to constitute a collective to "think what we are doing" and act on it. This is an outstanding and innovative critical diagnostic tool for considering

the dilemmas and shortcomings regarding justice in genomics today; but Reardon left me wanting about the conditions of different forms or degrees of justice. It is telling, perhaps, that her epilogue of a space of hope, the democratic collective urban space of Tempelhofer Field in Berlin, has nothing to do with genomics.

This is a book that will have me thinking for a long time. Those researching or teaching graduate classes in science, culture, politics, or the sociology of morality, social theory, or race and ethnicity will find much of interest here.

American Exceptionalism in Crime and Punishment, edited by **Kevin R. Reitz**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 565 pp. \$65.00 cloth. ISBN: 9780190203542.

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Legal scholar Kevin Reitz has assembled an impressive cast of sociologists, criminologists, and legal scholars from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France to interrogate what makes the United States exceptional when it comes to crime and punishment. Scholars generally frame American exceptionalism in comparison to western Europe and in terms of the United States' fantastically high incarceration rates and its retention of the death penalty. The aim of this volume is to move beyond the typical markers of exceptionalism to consider other features of the American carceral state, such as probation, parole, and the collateral consequences of felony conviction. In addition, in a move that is particularly timely, Reitz also wants to incorporate America's uniquely high violent crime rates into the discussion of American exceptionalism. Read together, the chapters in *American Exceptionalism in Crime and Punishment* are more ambitious than Reitz suggests. The book offers a deeper way to think about American exceptionalism in crime and punishment that can be applied to other American "exceptionalisms." In particular, it pushes scholars to embrace the complexity within